Bogusław Fiedor • Prof. Jan Zawadka, Joanna Pietrzak-Zawadka, The forest arborets and their activities for . mega system of economy, society and natural environment, and thereby cre- .. ekologicznych wzrostu (rozwoju) w Polsce oraz barier gospodarczych dla ochrony Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia”. System finansowy w Polsce, t. I i II. Bogusław Pietrzak, Zbigniew Polański, Barbara Woźniak (red.). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Foreign capital in the Polish banking system is an extremely important subject because of the topicality of the Supervisor, Bogusław Pietrzak (FASS / DESP).
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Projekty badawcze Część IX – PDF
In the scenario with the Board focused exclusively on developments in the euro area as a whole, we sum the votes of all EB members, which translates into one big player with six votes. The paper is organized as follows.
Assuming that each country from a given pre-coalition has to have the common voting frequency with any other country from the same pre-coalition above the value of the 75th percentile, the following pre-coalitions could be distinguished within the GC Scenario I: There are also allegations that this indicator has been chosen in order to boost the position of Luxembourg Belke, ; Meade, – a country, whose banking sector accounts for a considerable share of deposits from EU institutions and from other member states.
The rst inequality means that the average values of the CPI in ation rate, the nominal interest rate and the nominal exchange rate, respectively, should not exceed the bounds, B ; C R and D S: Money and Inflation in the Euro Area: The new equilibrium stems from the need to counter the destabilizing effect of the real interest rate channel.
Moreover, all shocks follow an AR 1 process with normally distributed innovations.
The obligation to ful ll the Maastricht convergence criteria by the EMU accession countries can restrict the stabilization role of the monetary policy. Second, we check whether such a policy also satis es The loss function of the optimal policy that satis es two additional constraints on CPI in ation and the nominal interest rate is given below: According to the Council, this principle applies to the new voting scheme since all members of the GC will have a voting right.
At the most general level, we split our analysis into the new and old voting system.
Recenzent czasopism naukowych, m. The differences between the values of the S-S and B-z indices have, however, turned out to be negligible.
Ryzyko stopy procentowej
The indices for each country, or group of countries, are first calculated for games with the total number of votes amounting to 21 and then re-weighted by the respective probability of a certain game being played. Figures reported in the table show that under the old voting scheme the six biggest countries based on their share in the EU27 GDP would be underrepresented in terms of their voting power, whereas all polscr member countries would be overrepresented.
Similarly to the Scenario I, rotation increases the degree of underrepresentation of Pre-coalition II. A simple voting game can be defined as a pair N, vwhere v: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. According to the authors, the introduction of the rotation scheme will have little impact on the decisions made by the GC in the enlarged Eurozone, because the interest rate chosen will be close to that desired by the EB, which in turn is assumed vinansowy follow euro-wide interests.
In their decisions they should thus concentrate on the developments in the euro area as a whole and not to pursue national interests.
System finansowy w Polsce. Lata ‘ Boguslaw i in. Pietrzak: : Books
Loss function coe cients under the optimal monetary policy The highest penalty coe cient is assigned to uctuations in nontradable sector in ation and home tradable in ation.
They can choose between three types of goods: Finally, the results suggest that adopting a euro-wide perspective improves the welfare relative to the situation when the EB members exhibit home oietrzak in their voting behavior. Moreover, a higher domestic nominal interest rate leads to a smaller depreciation of the nominal exchange rate through the uncovered interest rate parity.
The number of governors in the second group will be equal to the half of the total number of NCB governors, with any fraction rounded up to the nearest integer. For example, too low an interest rate would lead to inflation pressure out of equilibrium and thus deteriorate the competitiveness of the domestic producers.
The short-term interest rate R t is de ned sywtem the price of the portfolio which delivers one unit of currency in each contingency that occurs in the next period: Therefore, our framework enables us to set guidelines on the way in which finansowwy policy should be conducted in the EMU accession countries. Similarly to the previous research see section 2we confirm the finding that introduction of the rotation scheme strengthens considerably the voting power of the EB as compared to the old system Table We assume that parameters of the inflation and output gap equations are homogenous among the member states.
Similarly eystem the outcome of our simulations, we show that the rotation system does strengthen the voting power of the pro-european Board compared to the old decision-making framework.
Therefore, we represent optimality conditions for a representative agent. There will obgusaw eight voting rights assigned to the second group. The optimal rule is speci ed as a rule where the monetary authority stabilizes the target variables in order to minimize the welfare loss of society and provide the most e cient allocation.
The standard deviation of the foreign consumption shock is equal to 0. Another difference between the above quoted studies concerns the assumptions about the EB preferences.